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APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) because this is an 
appeal from a judgment of the district court. This Court has previously determined to 
retain this case on direct review. (Addend. Ex. 1.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err as a matter of law by concluding on summary 
judgment that SmartBargains' intentional directing of internet pop-up ads to Overstock's 
website per se could not constitute unfair competition or tortious interference? 
2. Did the district court err as a matter of law by granting summary judgment 
on Overstock's common law claims given the disputed material fact record and the lower 
court's reliance on facts that did not appear of record? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Overstock the 
opportunity to fully develop the record before granting summary judgment? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is a legal determination reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference given to the district court's ruling. See Johnson v. UDOT, 2006 UT 15, % 15, 
133 P.3d 402. This Court reviews the record facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. Summary 
judgment is improvidently granted if (a) the law does not entitle the moving party to a 
judgment, or (b) there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Davis v. Central Utah Counseling Or., 2006 UT 52, U 30, 147 P.3d 390. 
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"As for the trial court's 56(f) ruling, we review it under an abuse of discretion 
standard: Does the grant or denial 'exceed the limits of reasonability.'" Price Dev. Co. v. 
Orem City, 2000 UT 26, H 9, 995 P.2d 1237 (quoting Crossland Savs. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 
1241, 1243 (Utah 1994)). 
PRESERVATION BELOW 
Overstock's appeal issues were each preserved in the district court. (R.l-16, 
78-92, 264-76, 338-43, 364-68, 509-45, 610-12, 752-54.) 
ADDENDUM 
The addendum includes this Court's retention order (Ex. 1); the complaint, which 
includes one of the two pop-up ads reviewed by the district court (Ex. 2); the district 
court's relevant rulings (Exs. 3-6); and the other pop-up ad - which does not contain a 
"disclaimer" - along with the accompanying affidavit presented below (Ex. 7). The 
addendum is preceded by an index. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case of first impression queries whether internet pop-up ads intentionally 
directed at a competitor's website and overtly designed to trick customers and cause 
confusion may give rise to common law liability for unfair competition and tortious 
interference. The district court dismissed these claims on summary judgment, concluding 
as a matter of law that they may not. The appellant here, Overstock.com, Inc., asks this 
Court to correct that error by reversing the judgment on this record and remanding for 
further development of the facts and a trial on the merits. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Overstock.com, Inc., commenced suit against competitor SmartBargains, Inc., on 
May 8, 2004, based on SmartBargains5 intentional directing of internet pop-up ads over 
the top of Overstock's website. (R.l.) The complaint premised its claims for relief on 
three causes of action: (1) violation of the Utah Spyware Regulation Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-39-01, et seq.; (2) common law unfair competition; and (3) tortious interference 
with prospective economic advantage. (R.l0-15.) The case was assigned to Judge Noel. 
(R.l.) 
After answering the complaint, SmartBargains filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings directed at all three causes of action. (R.22, 46.) Following briefing and a 
hearing, the court denied the motion. (R.l 18-19, 126-28, 752.) SmartBargains moved 
for reconsideration or alternatively for Rule 54(b) certification. (R.139.) Judge Hanson, 
to whom the case was ultimately reassigned upon Judge Noel's retirement, denied the 
motion. (R.400, 403-04, 330, 310, 329.) 
Overstock's efforts to complete discovery before a determination on the merits 
were opposed by SmartBargains. (R.121, 192, 135, 149-50, 340-41, 541, 644.) 
SmartBargains moved first for a protective order seeking a postponement of discovery 
pending the outcome of its reconsideration motion. (R.l 35, 150.) When that motion was 
denied, SmartBargains delayed discovery then produced documents for attorneys' eyes 
only. (R.334-36, 376-88, 541, 663-64, 666-67.) SmartBargains then sought to resolve 
the case by further motion before discovery was completed. (R.389-95, 412, 754 at 5-6.) 
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On March 31, 2006, SmartBargains moved for summary judgment on all three 
claims. (R.412.) That portion of the motion directed at Overstock's common law claims 
was based principally on Overstock's allegations in its pleadings. (R.421-22.) 
SmartBargains submitted one affidavit directed to two discrete issues, suggesting that 
Overstock itself had previously used pop-ups and that consumers who received 
SmartBargains pop-ups had agreed to receive them. (R.502-03.) In support of its 
motion, SmartBargains further maintained that all its pop-up ads were accompanied by a 
disclaimer. (R.422.) SmartBargains submitted no other evidence outside of Overstock's 
pleadings. (R.421-22.) 
Overstock opposed the summary judgment motion with an affidavit of its own and 
with evidence of two SmartBargains pop-ups - one without a disclaimer. (R.509-40, 7.) 
Overstock also submitted affidavit testimony from a computer user who averred that he 
had not done anything to agree to receive SmartBargains' pop-ups, and that the pop-ups 
had appeared automatically without any action on his part. (R.539-40.) Overstock 
simultaneously filed a Rule 56(f) motion asking for discovery in advance of any ruling on 
summary judgment. (R.541-45.) 
Following briefing and a hearing, the district court denied Overstock's request for 
discovery and granted summary judgment in favor of SmartBargains. (R.668-74, 703-15, 
754.) The district court's order concluded the case by entering judgment in favor of 
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SmartBargains on all of Overstock's claims. (R.714.) Overstock timely appealed the 
dismissal of its common law claims. (R.716.)1 
C. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 
Allegations in the Complaint 
Overstock is a Utah-based company publicly traded on NASDAQ. (R.2; Addend. 
Ex. 2.) Overstock sells brand name consumer products at clearance prices. (R.2.) 
Overstock's customers purchase their products via Overstock's internet website located at 
wwvv.overstock.com, as well as through its toll-free telephone number. (R.2.) 
SmartBargains also sells consumer products through its internet website located at 
www.smartbargains.com, as well as by telephone and mail. (R.2.) Overstock and 
SmartBargains are competitors. (R.2.) 
Overstock has invested substantially in the information systems and internet 
infrastructure necessary to support customer sales. (R.5.) Because Overstock derives a 
large portion of its sales from e-commerce, it expends substantial effort to present its 
webpage content with a specific "look and feel" that will encourage site visitors to remain 
at the site, to purchase Overstock's products, and to return to Overstock's website for 
future purchases. (R.5.) Overstock deliberately designs its website to display and 
advertise its products and related information in a manner that will be visually attractive 
and easy to navigate for site visitors. (R.5.) The website is in essence Overstock's 
"showroom." (R.5.) 
1
 Overstock does not appeal the district court's determination that the Utah Spyware 
Regulation Act imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce and was 
therefore unconstitutional. (R.709-11.) 
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Overstock uses its website to advertise and to sell its consumer products. (R.6.) 
Overstock does not permit other advertising on its website. (R.6.) Moreover, 
Overstock's website does not utilize "pop-up" advertisements. (R.6.) 
SmartBargains competes with Overstock by engaging in aggressive advertising 
that targets customers visiting Overstock's website. (R.6.) Beginning in at least 2003, 
SmartBargains caused pop-up advertisements to appear over the top of Overstock's 
website. (R.7.) The pop-ups were not authorized by Overstock. (R.7.) Overstock 
incorporated an example of one such pop-up directly into its complaint. (R.7; Addend. 
Ex. 2.) 
The SmartBargains pop-ups appear over the top of Overstock's website using a 
similar color scheme and providing "offers," "savings," and "bargains" in association 
with the words "smart bargains." (R.7, 538.) Overstock alleges that SmartBargains 
disseminated these pop-up ads with the intent to confuse and deceive customers as to the 
source of SmartBargains' services, to trade upon and pass off as its own the goodwill and 
substantial customer recognition associated with Overstock. (R.9.) Overstock further 
alleges that a likelihood of confusion presents itself to current and potential customers 
regarding the origin and sponsorship of SmartBargains' services and implied affiliation 
with Overstock. (R.9, 11.) Overstock's complaint alleges that SmartBargains' actions 
were deliberate and undertaken in bad faith. (R.l 1.) 
Facts Submitted on Summary Judgment 
In moving for summary judgment, SmartBargains relied principally on allegations 
from Overstock's complaint, including the background facts regarding the parties' 
*11 ^<50?9v3 6 
businesses and the reproduced example of a SmartBargains pop-up incorporated directly 
into the pleadings. (R.421,7.) 
As part of its motion, however, SmartBargains submitted as a material fact that 
each of its pop-up ads include disclaimer language similar to the following: "This ad is 
brought to you by software from the GAIN Network. It is not brought to you or 
sponsored by the Web site(s) you are viewing." (R.422.) Overstock opposed this with 
contrary evidence, submitting a SmartBargains ad that did not contain such a disclaimer, 
which appeared over the top of Overstock's website. (R.515-16, 538.) 
SmartBargains also submitted as a material fact that SmartBargains had entered 
into contractual relationships with companies that provide internet advertising on behalf 
of SmartBargains "including the delivery of advertisements to individual consumers who 
have agreed to receive cpop-up' advertisements." (R.422.) Overstock opposed this with 
an affidavit from Clark Stephens, who testified that he had received a SmartBargains 
pop-up over the top of Overstock's website without requesting it and without taking any 
specific action to change the computer screen, which automatically provided the pop-up 
over the Overstock website. (R.539-40, 538.) 
In opposing summary judgment, Overstock also pointed out factual disputes and 
inferences presented by the pop-up evidence, including the fact that computer users 
directing their internet browsers to Overstock's website were met with a single visual 
image: the Overstock website framing a pop-up ad placed just below the Overstock 
trademark, all of which appears to the user to be part of the Overstock website. (R.516, 
7.) Overstock also argued the factual issues presented by the color scheme and the 
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relation of the pop-up to the Overstock name. (R.754 at 44.) Overstock further noted 
that unsupported hearsay testimony submitted by SmartBargains accusing Overstock of 
previously using pop-up ads was immaterial to the question whether SmartBargains' pop-
ups in this case gave rise to common law liability. (R.514-15; see also R.753 at 32.) 
Finally, Overstock noted that, besides the two narrow affidavits submitted by the 
parties, "the information the court currently has is next to none, other than what is in the 
complaint." (R.754 at 4.) Overstock's requested discovery related to "the question of 
confusion, intent to utilize the website of Overstock, and the two common law claims." 
(R.754 at 4.) 
Following the dismissal of its complaint, Overstock took this appeal, challenging 
the dismissal of its claims for unfair competition and tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal rests principally on three grounds. 
First, the district court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment for 
SmartBargains on Overstock's common law claims. The focus of unfair competition 
analysis is the intent of the defendant in attempting to affiliate its business with that of the 
plaintiffs. Overstock states a claim under Utah law based on SmartBargains' actions. 
The federal case law relied upon by the district court is distinguishable as it never 
considered common law claims. The well-established rules of unfair competition apply 
in this internet case just as they apply in the world of brick and mortar. For equivalent 
reasons, the tortious interference claim should move forward. Overstock states an 
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interference claim under Utah law based on SmartBargains' improper motives and 
means. Overstock deserves its day in court, as Judge Noel properly ruled in denying 
judgment on the pleadings. Judge Hanson's subsequent contrary decision, made with no 
substantive change to the record, is erroneous as a matter of law and should be reversed. 
Second, the district court erred as a matter of law by entering summary judgment 
on this factual record. SmartBargains' motion rested primarily on Overstock's pleadings, 
which properly stated claims for relief. To the extent additional material evidence was 
submitted, Overstock countered that evidence with directly conflicting evidence of its 
own. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriately granted. The district court also 
relied on factual determinations unsupportable on this record. Summary judgment is not 
the time for a district judge to inject a personal view of facts without record support. 
Unchallenged allegations in the complaint are construed favorably to the nonmovant. 
Reversal is called for here. 
Finally, the district court abused its discretion by denying Overstock the right to 
complete discovery before entering a judgment of dismissal. The district court ruled on 
SmartBargains' motion without the benefit of a fully developed record. This contrasts 
sharply with other pop-up cases, including those on which the district court relied. 
Before a dispositive determination precluding its claims with prejudice, Overstock was 
entitled at least to discovery establishing what SmartBargains had disseminated, in what 
form, and under what circumstances. The district court assumed in ruling that two pop-
up ads accurately represented the thousands at issue, without allowing Overstock even to 
confirm as much. The lower court ruled without the benefit of record evidence directed 
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to the principal issues. In the event the summary judgment ruling is not reversed on its 
merits, this Court should reverse and remand on the district court's discretionary Rule 
56(f) decision denying Overstock the chance to complete all necessary discovery. 
In sum, the grant of summary judgment was reversible error on this record. For 
the reasons set forth herein, this Court should correct that error on review. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE OVERSTOCK STATES COMMON LAW 
CLAIMS ON THIS RECORD. 
A. Overstock states a claim for common law unfair competition. 
Dismissal of Overstock's common law unfair competition claim should be 
reversed for three reasons. First, Utah law provides for such a claim when harmful 
"passing off occurs as it has here. Second, the cases relied upon by the district court are 
inapposite. Third, unfair competition case law confirms that application of established 
rules in traditional business settings can and should apply equally in this internet setting. 
1. Utah case law recognizes Overstock's claim. 
Utah has long applied the common law of unfair competition. See, e.g., Beard v. 
Board of Education, 16 P.2d 900 (Utah 1932); Rocky Mtn. Bell Tel. Co. v. Utah Ind. Tel. 
Co., 88 P. 26 (Utah 1906). "Unfair competition consists in passing off or attempting to 
pass off, upon the public, the goods or business of one person as and for the goods or 
business of another." Id. at 902. 
Unfair competition as we understand it, consists in one person 
imitating by some device or designation the wares made and 
sold by another for the purpose of palming off or substituting 
his wares for those of another, and in that way misleading the 
purchaser by inducing him to buy the wares made and sold by 
the first instead of those by the second. This, in law 
constitutes misrepresentation and deception, and therefore 
becomes, and is, a fraud, not only against the person whose 
wares are thus imitated, but against the public as well. 
Rocky Mtn. Bell 88 P. at 28; see also Budget Sys., Inc. v. Budget Loan & Fin. Plan, 361 
P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1961); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 
483 (1922); American Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1992). This Court 
has expressly held that methods of advertising fall within the common law unfair 
competition framework. State v. Russell Inc., 118 P.2d 679, 679 (Utah 1941). 
The question here focuses on SmartBargains' pop-up ads, which track with 
Overstock's color scheme and appear to be affiliated with Overstock's website. (Addend. 
Exs. 2, 7.) The ultimate test focuses on the defendant's intent, informed by the 
defendant's conduct. As this Court explained in Hi-Land Dairyman's Ass'n v. Cloverleaf 
Dairy, 151 P.2d 710 (Utah 1944): 
The test of unfair competition is whether the maker or seller 
of the goods is, by his conduct, passing off his goods as the 
complainant's goods, and not whether the public is likely to 
be deceived as to who is the maker or seller of the goods. 
Id. at 717; see also Rocky Mtn. Bell, supra (enunciating test as imitation by device or 
designation for the purpose of palming off business of one as that of another). Thus, an 
unfair competition claim does not require actual confusion or even a showing that the 
public is likely to be deceived, although these may assist in the ultimate determination. 
The focus is the defendant's intent and actions - not, as the district court suggested, 
merely the effect. (R.671.) 
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The questions of intent and confusion, as well as the nature of the ads, are 
inherently fact-intensive, subject to competing inferences that include those chargeable to 
the inevitable consequences of the defendant's conduct. See Hi-Land, 151 P.2d at 717. 
As Judge Learned Hand observed, "there is no part of the law more plastic than unfair 
competition. . . . As we view it, the question is, as it always is in such cases, one of fact." 
Elv-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2nd Cir. 1925), rev'd on other 
grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927); see also Raffoler v. Peabody Wright, 671 F. Supp. 947, 
953 (E.D.N. Y. 1987) ("Likelihood of confusion is a factual issue."); Haeger Potteries, 
Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 261, 270 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ("Whether, as urged 
at bar, the placing of defendant's name on the bottom of the ash tray sufficiently 
differentiates it from plaintiffs product depends upon 'the nature of the article and the 
reasonable certainty that the mark will be seen and appreciated by the ordinary 
purchaser.'"). Judge Hanson's opening reaction to the common law issues at the 
summary judgment hearing was the correct one, expressly recognizing the factual nature 
of the inquiry: 
Well, I don't want to decide as a matter of law about some 
facts one way or the other whether or not these pop-up ads 
create confusion or whether they're misleading or deceiving. 
Those are inherently factual. 
(R.754 at 15.) Given the legal framework, the learned district judge nevertheless erred 
when he subsequently concluded that SmartBargains was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law - by making the very determination he knew intuitively was factual when first 
presented. 
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The district court had before it evidence to support a finding for Overstock that 
SmartBargains intended to deceive and confuse. The pop-up ads are similar in color and 
appearance to Overstock's website. (R.7, 538.) They are made to appear directly below 
Overstock's name on Overstock's website. (R.7.) They offer "smart bargains" to 
customers who are accessing the Overstock website. (R.7, 538.) They offer the very 
types of consumer goods offered on Overstock's site. (R.2, 7, 538.) 
This highly factual inquiry is not subject to summary disposition. It is insufficient 
for SmartBargains to make bald assertions that there was no consumer confusion or no 
intent to confuse. (R.754 at 15-16, 34-35.) Nor was it proper for the district court to 
conclude as a matter of law that SmartBargains did not intend to confuse or mislead. 
(R.712-13.) Overstock is entitled on this record to present its evidence for determination 
by a fact finder after further evidentiary development. 
A fact finder could properly conclude that SmartBargains, by its conduct, intended 
its pop-up advertisements to be deceptive, confusing, or misleading to customers and/or 
attempted to pass itself off as affiliated with Overstock. When the ads appear on an 
Overstock customer's computer for no other reason than because the customer was 
attempting to access the Overstock webpage, SmartBargains trades off the very things 
that bring customers to Overstock's webpage - Overstock's reputation, goodwill, and 
established name. Furthermore, the placement of the pop-up ads and the potential to lead 
Overstock customers away from the Overstock webpage are overtly designed to deceive 
and confuse customers as to sponsorship of the SmartBargains ads and the relationship 
between Overstock and SmartBargains. 
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The manner in which SmartBargains delivers the pop-ups within the Overstock 
website is the functional equivalent of a salesperson standing within the entrance of a 
competitor's business and dealing for his own account with customers who believe they 
are dealing with the business they came to visit. That type of act is actionable in the real-
world marketplace, and it is and should be similarly actionable in the virtual marketplace. 
See infra part LA.3. 
This Court noted in Aliens Products Co. v. Glover, 414 P.2d 93 (Utah 1966), that 
the "[pjirating of that which belongs to another and deceiving the public is so plainly 
contrary to principles of fairness and good conscience that courts of equity have not 
hesitated to grant redress." Id. at 95. SmartBargains5 pop-ups do just that. Computer 
users directing their internet browser to Overstock's website are met with a single visual 
image. (R.538.) The ad appears with no additional commands or requests from the user. 
(R.539-40.) The placement of the ad suggests both sponsorship of the ad by Overstock 
and/or some sort of business affiliation between Overstock and SmartBargains. (R.7.) At 
the very least this is a factual determination. See Ely-Norris Safe Co., supra. 
The ruling below is based on the arguments of SmartBargains' counsel or the 
district judge's own view of what happens when a computer user ventures into 
cyberspace, not on record evidence. See also infra part II.B. Given the allegations and 
evidence in this case, it was legal error to dismiss Overstock's claims on summary 
judgment. 
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2. The cases relied upon by the district court are inapposite. 
The district court rested its unfair competition ruling primarily on three reported 
decisions. (R.671-72, 712.) A review of those cases demonstrates that none provides 
authority for dismissing Overstock's claim. 
First, in U-Haul International Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. 
Va. 2003), U-Haul pleaded federal Lanham Act and copyright claims based on the 
defendant's use of pop-up advertisements. See kL at 724, 726. Despite pleading separate 
common law claims, U-Haul agreed to resolve the case based solely on its federal claims. 
See id. The court dismissed the federal claims on summary judgment, concluding that 
"the computer software at issue does not copy or use U-Haul's trademark or copyright 
material" and therefore does not constitute a uuse in commerce" of U-Haul's trademarks 
as required by the Lanham Act. See id, at 725, 727-29, 731 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§1114 
and 1125(a)). Because of U-Haul's prior request, the court did not reach the common 
law claims, dismissing them instead without prejudice. See id. at 726, 731-32. Nothing 
about U-Haul would preclude Overstock's common law claims. 
Next, Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 
2003), considered whether to grant a preliminary injunction against the defendant's pop-
up ads. See id. at 736. The question again was whether such pop-ups violated federal 
trademark or copyright law. See id. at 736, 757. The parties developed an extensive 
factual record based on a thorough evidentiary hearing before the court, including 
detailed findings about the workings of the software in question and the nature of the 
pop-up ads. See id. at 737-56. Based on those lengthy findings, the district court denied 
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the preliminary injunction motion. See id. at 757. The court concluded that Wells Fargo 
had not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success under Sixth Circuit standards 
because the defendant did not "use" Wells Fargo's marks in commerce, as required by 
the Lanham Act. See id. at 757-64. The court also noted, in obiter dicta, that Wells 
Fargo had not demonstrated a likelihood of confusion. See id. at 764-69. Because the 
other elements necessary to establish the right to preliminary injunctive relief were 
likewise not met, the court denied the motion. See id at 771-73. 
Lastly, a preliminary injunction was granted on federal Lanham Act claims in 
1-800 Contacts, then subsequently reversed on interlocutory appeal. See 1-800 Contacts, 
Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd, 414 F.3d 400 (2nd 
Cir. 2005). Plaintiff 1-800 sued under a variety of federal and state law theories based on 
the defendant's use of pop-up ads. See 414 F.3d at 402 & n.4. 1-800's theories included 
common law claims for unfair competition and tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage. See id. The district court held an evidentiary hearing before 
entering its ruling granting the preliminary injunction. See id. at 405. The court of 
appeals reversed the injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal 
trademark infringement claims, but directed the lower court to proceed with the 
remaining claims, including the common law claims. See id. at 403, 402 n.4. The 
Second Circuit rejected the Lanham Act claims on the same grounds decided in the other 
two WhenU decisions: there was no "use in commerce" as required to sustain a Lanham 
Act claim. Id. at 406, 407-13. The court concluded: 
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In issuing the preliminary injunction, the district court expressly confined its 
findings in support of the injunction to 1-800's trademark infringement. 
Accordingly, 1-800's remaining claims, as to which we express no view, will be 
the subject of further proceedings on remand. 
fcL at 412-13. 
In short, none of the cases relied on below reached the merits of common law 
claims based on the use of pop-up ads. Each of the reported WhenU decisions confined 
its holding instead to federal Lanham Act claims and the required "use in commerce" 
element. Moreover, two of the three cases were decided based on an extensively 
developed factual record examining the issues presented. This contrasts sharply with the 
district court's decision in the instant case, which dismissed Overstock's claims on 
summary judgment based on pre-discovery factual determinations that were unsupported 
by the pleadings or record, and entered despite conflicting evidence. See infra part II. 
Although unfair competition claims are often closely associated with claims of 
trademark infringement, infringement is merely one type of anticompetitive conduct that 
falls under the broader rubric of the common law of unfair competition. 
Trade-name or trade-mark infringement is a narrower term than 
unfair competition, but it is a species of it. . . . [UJnfair conduct, the 
natural and probable result of which is to permit the goods of one 
person, of the same kind, to be passed off for those of another, is 
usually unfair competition, in some form, and in a proper case will 
be enjoined. 
Hi-Land, 151 P.2d at 717. Utah case law is replete with examples of unfair competition 
claims wholly unrelated to claims of trademark infringement. See, e.g., Press Publ., Ltd. 
v. Matol Botanical Int'l Ltd., 2001 UT 106, *h 4 n.5, 37 P.3d 1121 (unfair competition in 
connection with antitrust claims); Utah Bankers Ass'n v. America First Credit Union, 912 
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P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1996) (unfair competition in connection with violations of Utah 
Credit Union Act); Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 
(Utah 1986) (unfair competition in connection with statutory leasing procedure); 
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98 (Utah 1981) (unfair 
competition in connection with trade secret violations); Moutain States Tele. & Telegraph 
Co. v. Salt Lake City, 596 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1979) (unfair competition in connection 
with passage of city ordinance); Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (unfair competition in connection with trade secret violations). 
In sum, Overstock has a viable unfair competition claim against SmartBargains. 
Nothing about the three federal cases the district court cited would preclude that. Indeed, 
by their very terms they do not.2 
3. Well-established rules based on traditional business models apply 
equally in this internet case. 
The venerable case law from around the country properly recognizes a common 
law claim for unfair competition in traditional business settings. The reasoning of those 
cases applies equally here, demonstrating further that summary judgment was 
improvidently granted. The principles from those cases are discussed next, illustrated by 
representative cases and discussion. 
2
 The cases relied upon by the district court have been criticized on their merits because 
the use of unauthorized pop-up ads allows companies to "plant or interpose new 
advertisements over existing web pages without the website's operator's consent. Such 
internet advertising distorts what the host website sponsors." Michael A. Leon, Note, 
Unauthorized Pop-up Advertising and the Copyright and Unfair Competition 
Implications, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 953, 957, 967-68 (Spring 2004) (citations omitted). 
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The Restatement recognizes unfair competition as a viable cause of action on 
terms equivalent to Utah law. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
provides: 
One is subject to liability to another under [the general rule prohibiting 
deceptive marketing contained in Restatement § 2] if, in connection with 
the marketing of goods or services, the actor makes a representation likely 
to deceive or mislead prospective purchasers by causing the mistaken belief 
that the actor's business is the business of the other or that the actor is the 
agent, affiliate, or associate of the other, or that the goods or services that 
the actor markets are produced, sponsored, or approved by the other. 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 4 (1995 & Supp. 2005); see also id. § 2. 
See generally idL §§ 1-8. This restatement of the common law squares with Utah's 
approach. See supra part LA. 
Technically correct ads may give rise to liability if they create a false 
impression of affiliation. In Raffoler v. Peabody Wright, 671 F. Supp. 947 (E.D.N.Y. 
1987), the court denied a motion to dismiss a claim for unfair competition based on 
defendant's use of advertisements that were confusingly similar to those used by plaintiff, 
a mail order company. Id at 955. It was no defense that the defendant's advertisements, 
which mimicked phraseology from the plaintiffs, were technically accurate with respect 
to the origin of the goods if the overall effect was to create an impression of affiliation: 
Courts have held that likelihood of confusion as to origin may arise from a 
representation, which although technically correct, creates a false impression. 
Id. at 954. The court concluded that "[t]he use of defendant's own corporate names and 
mailing address does not, contrary to defendant's contentions, in and of itself prevent 
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public confusion as to the origin of the goods." Id. The plaintiff therefore stated a claim 
for "passing off." Id at 955. 
Competing businesses that make themselves appear to be affiliated are 
subject to liability even if they clearly use their own name. In Charles S. Cash, Inc. v. 
Steinbook, 220 A.D. 569 (N.Y. App. 1927), aff d mem., 247 N.Y. 531 (1928), plaintiff 
operated from storefronts designed with an orange and blue paint-scheme. Defendant 
later established his own stores with a similar orange and blue paint-scheme, as well as 
substantially similar slogans. Id. at 570-71. The appeals court reversed denial of an 
injunction, concluding that defendant had violated plaintiffs rights by building 
storefronts substantially similar to plaintiffs. See id. The claim was not defeated merely 
by the fact that defendant accurately used its own name on the storefront. See id. 
Addressing the claim that the storefronts were, in fact, different, the court held: 
It is not necessary that the symbol, figure, or device used or printed and sold for 
use, should be a facsimile, a precise copy, of the original trade mark, or so close an 
imitation that the two cannot be distinguished except by an expert, or upon a 
critical examination by one familiar with the genuine trade mark. If the false is 
only colorably different from the true; if the resemblance is such as to deceive a 
purchaser of ordinary caution; or if it is calculated to deceive the careless and 
unwary; and thus to injure the sale of the goods of the proprietor of the trade mark, 
the injured party is entitled to relief. 
IcL at 572 (quoting Colman v. Crump, 70 N.Y. 573, 578 (1877)). 
Likewise, in Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142 (Cal. 1895), the 
California Supreme Court addressed plaintiffs claim that defendant was committing 
unfair competition by mimicking his storefront. Defendant opened a business next door 
designing its storefront to look like plaintiffs store. Id, at 143. The court affirmed an 
injunction against the defendant for his use of the storefront and a confusingly similar 
name. Id. at 146-147. Addressing defendant's efforts to make his store appear similar to 
plaintiffs, the court noted: 
It may well be said that the defendant, by duplicating plaintiffs building, with its 
peculiar architecture, and immediately adjoining, entering into the same line of 
business, with no mark of identification upon his store, has dressed himself in 
plaintiffs garments, and having so dressed himself with a fraudulent intent, equity 
will exert itself to reach the fraud in some way. 
Id at 145; see also Summerfield Co. v. Prime Furniture Co., 242 Mass. 149(1922) 
(under common law doctrine of unfair competition, defendant was enjoined from 
maintaining his storefront in a manner designed to appear similar to plaintiffs and thus to 
deceive the public). Notably, Marks addressed the fact that a claim for unfair 
competition is distinct from a claim for trademark infringement: 
The foregoing principles of law [regarding unfair competition] do not apply alone 
to the protection of parties having trademarks and trade names. They reach away 
beyond that, and apply to all cases where fraud is practiced by one in securing the 
trade of a rival dealer; and these ways are as many and as various as the ingenuity 
of the dishonest schemer can invent. 
Marks, supra, at 146. 
The reviewing court will consider the relative importance to the plaintiff of 
the medium being mimicked by the defendant. In GRI Corp. v. Golden Fifty Pharm. 
Co., 185 U.S.P.Q. 674 (N.D. 111. 1975), the plaintiff conducted a national advertising 
campaign for cosmetic products. If customers purchased a kit, they would receive a 
welcome letter shortly thereafter. Id. at *3. Plaintiff alleged that defendant copied five 
advertisements and letters to project the impression that the product originated with 
defendant. The "mailing coupon used by defendants is nearly identical to that employed 
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for years by plaintiff." Id. at * 13. The court held that "[gjiven the crucial role played by 
the mailing coupon to the method of distribution used by both parties, a fair amount of 
confusion can be inferred from these similarities." Id. 
Unfair competition may consist of any imitation of "a distinguishing earmark 
of an established business." In Manitowoc Malting Co. v. Milwaukee Malting Co., 119 
Wis. 543, 546 (1903), plaintiff claimed that defendant was using a symbol that was likely 
to confuse consumers regarding the source of the goods. The Court enjoined defendants 
from using the confusing symbol, holding that: 
Unfair competition in trade is not confined to the imitation of a trademark, but 
takes as many forms as the ingenuity of man can devise. It may consist of the 
imitation of a sign, a trade-name, a label, a wrapper, a package, or almost any 
other imitation by a business rival of some distinguishing earmark of an 
established business, which the court can see is calculated to mislead the public 
and lead purchasers into the belief that they are buying the goods of the first 
manufacturer. 
IcL at 546. 
Where there is intent to deceive, any doubts about confusion will be resolved 
in favor of the plaintiff. In Stewart's Sandwiches, Inc. v. Seward's Cafeteria, Inc., 60 
F.2d 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1932), the court enjoined defendant from using a sign-advertisement 
for his cafeteria that was designed specifically to look similar to plaintiffs signs. The 
court held that "[i]ntentional simulation having been established, any doubts as to 
probable and actual confusion will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff." Id. at 982. 
The issues in these cases are fact-intensive. As noted herein already, the 
determinations in these cases are fact-bound and require examination of the particulars of 
the record. See supra parts LA. and LB. (citing and discussing record-intensive cases). 
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These cases pronounce bedrock principles in unfair competition jurisprudence. 
They apply universally, regardless of the medium. Unfair competition is limited only by 
the resourcefulness of the schemer intending unfairly to draw customers away. Here, 
Overstock is entitled to have a fact finder detemiine its claims. The fact that e-commerce 
rather than brick and mortar provides the "storefront" should not alter the governing law. 
SmartBargains designed its pop-up ads to resemble Overstock's storefront, thereby 
attempting to create confusion in an effort to profit from Overstock's goodwill. See 
Marks, supra (concluding defendant's design was intended to "deceivfe] plaintiffs 
customers and persons intending to trade with plaintiff into believing that the defendant's 
store was that of the plaintiff). Here, there are no brick and mortar showrooms through 
which customers can become acquainted with Overstock. The relative importance of 
Overstock's website, and the style it illustrates, cannot be overstated. They are virtually 
everything to Overstock. 
In sum, the district court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Overstock's 
unfair competition claim on summary judgment. This is a factual decision for a jury. 
Overstock has adduced evidence to support its allegations. The district court's erroneous 
decision should be reversed and Overstock provided the opportunity to prove its claim. 
B. Overstock states a claim for tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage. 
Utah law provides a cause of action for tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage if (1) the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs 
existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
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means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. See Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 
P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). Judge Noel concluded that Overstock alleged all the 
necessary elements of this claim, allowing Overstock to move forward with discovery. 
(R.l 19, 127.) The claim should not subsequently have been dismissed when no 
additional facts were presented. 
The focus of SmartBargains' summary judgment motion on this claim was the 
Leigh Furniture element of improper purpose/improper means. (R.451-54.) 
Notwithstanding SmartBargains' contentions, Overstock alleges that SmartBargains 
acted deliberately and in bad faith to cause Overstock injury and used improper means to 
interfere. (R.l 1-12, 533-35.) Each of these points will be discussed in turn. 
Improper purpose "is established by a showing that the actor's predominant 
purpose was to injure the plaintiff." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991); see also Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307 ("Because it 
requires that the improper purpose predominate, this alternative takes the long view of 
the defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable short-run purposes to be eclipsed by 
long-range economic motivation."). "[A] purpose to divert or capture a competitor's 
business . . . is perfectly legitimate so long as it is not carried out unfairly." Trade 
Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Ctrs., Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 965 (Utah 1968). Because intent is 
rarely established by direct evidence, a fact finder can infer the requisite purpose by 
circumstantial evidence and inferences. See, e.g., In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953, 956 (10th 
Cir. 1990) ("fraudulent intent may be deduced from the facts and circumstances of the 
case"). 
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The extent to which SmartBargains' predominant purpose has been to injure 
Overstock is subject to factual inquiry and resolution. This inquiry overlaps substantially 
with the unfair competition purpose and intent analysis. (R.453-54, 533-35, 713.) 
SmartBargains' overt purpose in directing its pop-ups over the top of Overstock's 
website is to mislead and deceive Overstock customers and misrepresent the nature of 
the relationship between Overstock and SmartBargains. See supra part LA. Pop-ups 
delivered without disclaimers is evidence of this purpose. (R.538.) Additionally, the 
extent to which the inclusion of an inconspicuous disclaimer on some pop-up ads 
prevented confusion, or was even intended by SmartBargains to do so, is a factual issue. 
(R.7.) 
The circumstances giving rise to this lawsuit are evidence of SmartBargains' 
improper purpose. Summary judgment was wrongly granted on this issue. 
This tort may also be proven by evidence of improper means. In St. Benedict's 
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991), this Court held that 
improper means may include circumstances 
"where the means used to interfere with a party's economic 
relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, 
regulations, or recognized common-law rules." Improper 
means include "violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit 
or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, 
defamation or disparaging falsehood. Means may also be 
improper or wrongful because they violate an established 
standard of a trade or a profession." 
Id, at 201 (quoting Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365 (Ore. 
1978)). 
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Deceptive trade practices occur in the course of business under Utah statutory 
law when any of the following takes place: 
(a) A person passes off goods or services as those of 
another. 
(b) A person causes likelihood of confusion or of 
misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or 
certification of goods or services. 
(c) A person causes likelihood of confusion or of 
misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, association 
with, or certification by another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la-3. This is precisely the type of conduct that SmartBargains has 
engaged in through use of pop-up ads that appear over the top of Overstock's website. 
These are, by definition, improper means. Common law unfair competition and the 
misleading nature of the conduct are as well. See Aliens Products, 414 P.2d at 95 
("deceiving the public is so plainly contrary to principles of fairness and good 
conscience"). 
The district court simplistically held that no basis existed for the tortious 
interference claim because, given its prior rulings, SmartBargains' pop-ups were not 
"deceptive, confusing or misleading." (R.672.) Reversal on that determination should 
result in reversal on dismissal of this tort as well. In all events, the Court has before it 
adequate pleadings and evidence to demonstrate SmartBargains' improper motives and 
means. A jury should decide this claim on its merits. 
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C. Judge Noel's decision was right, Judge Hanson's decision wrong. 
Judge Noel's initial decision denying summary disposition reached the right result. 
(R.l 19, 127.) In its complaint, Overstock alleged that SmartBargains' use of pop-up 
advertisements intended to deceive and mislead Overstock's potential customers, and that 
attempting to pass off its goods as those of Overstock constituted unfair competition and 
tortious interference with Overstock's prospective economic relations. (R.9-11.) Judge 
Noel denied SmartBargains' motion for judgment on the pleadings, expressly holding 
that "there are sufficient allegations made in the plaintiffs Complaint, which, if shown to 
be true, would support its claim for common law unfair competition and tortious 
interference with prospective economic advantage." (R. 118-19.) 
SmartBargains' subsequently filed motion for summary judgment was premised 
on the very same allegations Judge Noel deemed sufficient. (R.421-22.) Yet nothing 
relevant changed in this case between the time of Judge Noel's ruling that Overstock's 
unfair competition claim was legally sufficient and Judge Hanson's ruling that it wasn't. 
Between the two disparate rulings, no depositions were taken, limited document 
production occurred, and SmartBargains sought a judgment without allowing Overstock 
to develop additional evidentiary support for its allegations. Outside of two narrowly 
framed and conflicting affidavits submitted by the opposing parties, the only additional 
evidence presented was another example of a SmartBargains' pop-up ad - this one 
without any disclaimer of affiliation with Overstock. (R. at 538.) 
"Ordinarily one judge of the same court cannot properly overrule the decision of 
another judge of that court." Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil 692 P.2d 735, 736 
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(Utah 1984). This itself is grounds for reversal. Assuming arguendo that Judge Hanson 
could properly readdress the issue, though, nothing had changed in the interim that would 
dictate a different outcome. This case presents, essentially, two district judges reaching 
different decisions on the same issues. See id. (noting all material facts remained the 
same between different rulings by different judges). 
Judge Noel's was the better decision in this case. The law here allows Overstock 
to move forward. This Court should reverse the ultimate summary judgment opinion and 
remand for further proceedings. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT BASED ON 
UNDISPUTED RECORD FACTS. 
Nothing is more settled than the summary judgment standards on appellate review. 
See e.g., Johnson v. UDOT, 2006 UT 15, \ 15, 133 P.3d 402. This Court views the facts 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. Summary judgment is not 
appropriate if there exists a genuine issue as to a material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
In this case, two glaring factual faults underlie the district court's summary 
judgment determination. First, the motion was not decided based on an undisputed fact 
record. Second, the motion was not decided based on facts that appear in the record. 
Each will be discussed in turn. 
A. Material fact disputes preclude summary judgment. 
In support of its motion, SmartBargains maintained that all its pop-up ads were 
accompanied by a disclaimer. (R.422.) Overstock opposed the motion with a 
SmartBargains pop-up without a disclaimer. (R.509-40, 7.) Despite SmartBargains' 
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position that this fact was material to the ultimate disposition, the district court 
sidestepped it altogether. (Addend. Ex. 6.) This fact is highly material - as evidenced by 
SmartBargains' own claim that it is. Indeed, in arguing its earlier legal motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, SmartBargains deemed this one of the key points. (R.752 at 
6-7, 17,26.) 
In 1-800 Contacts, a disclaimer informed the computer user that the pop-up "was 
not affiliated with the site that the (user) was visiting." See 414 F.3d at 405 n.7. 
SmartBargains' disclaimer, when it did use one, was less extensive and less informative 
than the 1-800 Contacts disclaimer. (R.7.) In 1-800 Contacts, furthermore, the common 
law claims were allowed to proceed in the trial court even with the disclaimer. 414 F.3d 
at 403, 412-13. Here, evidence that the disclaimer sometimes appeared and sometimes 
did not strongly favors submission to a fact finder. This is a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
In support of its motion, SmartBargains also maintained that its pop-ups were 
directed to computer users who had agreed to receive them. (R.422.) Overstock opposed 
this position with affidavit testimony from a computer user who averred that he had not 
done anything to agree to receive SmartBargains' pop-ups, but that the pop-ups had 
appeared automatically without any action on his part. (R.539-40.) 
In addition, the overwhelming majority of the well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint were not put in issue by SmartBargains' very narrow affidavit. (R. 1-16, 
502-03.) Indeed, SmartBargains relied heavily on the complaint in bringing its motion. 
(R. 421-22.) The court considers unchallenged allegations in the pleadings when 
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determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2713, at 221, 222 ("A summary 
judgment motion is typically based on the pleadings as well as any affidavits, 
depositions, and other forms of evidence relevant to the merits of the challenged claim or 
defense."). It is the movant's obligation to demonstrate the absence of a material fact 
raised by the pleadings, the burden of which shifts to the nonmoving party only when the 
allegations have been challenged by record evidence. See, e.g., Colby v. Bank of 
Douglas, 370 P.2d 56, 57 (Ariz. 1962). 
The record before this Court does not support a summary judgment ruling against 
the nonmovant. The very facts SmartBargains deemed material to its motion were put in 
dispute with record evidence from Overstock. Those allegations that were not put it in 
issue are construed favorably to Overstock. Summary judgment is only appropriate in the 
absence of a material fact dispute. Disputes appear in the record here - in the affidavits 
and by virtue of the unchallenged pleaded facts - mandating a reversal. 
B. The district judge's ruling also relies on statements of fact that are not 
supported by the record. 
Both in his "'Determinations' of Fact" and his "Conclusions of Law," the district 
judge based his decision on facts that have no record support, let alone undisputed record 
support. (R.707-08, 711-13.) His order made the factual "determinations" that "[e]ach of 
the pop-up advertisements" is "separate and distinct from other open applications" and 
"clearly labeled" as being affiliated with SmartBargains. (R.708.) On the unfair 
competition claim, the judge ruled that "computer users are not confused by pop-up 
advertisements that appear in a window that is separate and distinct from the underlying 
website" and that "the advertisements do not deceive consumers as to their source." 
(R.712.) On the tortious interference claim, he concluded that the pop-ups "are not 
deceptive, confusing, or misleading." (R.713.) 
These factual assertions are unsupported by the record. While they reflect the 
arguments of SmartBargains' counsel or the district judge's own view of what happens 
when a computer user ventures into cyberspace, they are not backed by record evidence. 
Contrast the principal WhenU cases, where the trial judges engaged in extensive factual 
inquiry before rendering their decisions. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 
293 F.Supp. 2d 734, 737-56 (E.D. Mich. 2003); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 
Inc., 309 F.Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). No such 
evidence has been developed here. 
Summary judgment cannot be sustained when there is a dearth of supporting 
evidence on central issues. The law requires an undisputed fact record to uphold such a 
judgment. As it is notably missing here, reversal and a remand for correction are 
required. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE GRANT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY DENYING OVERSTOCK'S MOTION FOR RULE 
56(f) DISCOVERY. 
Rule 56(f) provides in relevant part: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or 
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may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions 
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). "Generally, summary judgment should not be granted if discovery 
is incomplete since information sought in discovery may create genuine issues of material 
fact sufficient to defeat the motion." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 
278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Rule 56(f) motions "should be granted liberally and [where] 
an adequate opportunity for discovery ha[s] not been provided, the motion for summary 
judgment should be adjourned pending the completion of such discovery." Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311,315 (Utah 1984). 
Overstock and its counsel made the appropriate showing to obtain Rule 56(f) 
relief. (R.541-45, 610-12.) Overstock noted that information provided in discovery had 
been marked Attorneys' Eyes Only, effectively making it impossible for Overstock to 
know about or discuss such information with its counsel. (R. 541.) Overstock further 
noted that it had not received documents already requested in discovery. (R. 541.) 
Overstock also pointed out that the WhenU.com cases on which SmartBargains relied so 
heavily had allowed discovery to proceed to the point where the parties had taken 
depositions and could file appropriate affidavits. (R.542-43.) Overstock argued that 
discovery here was critical to determine, at least, the extent to which the pop-up ads had 
(or had not) included disclaimers; the extent to which SmartBargains had intended to pass 
off its goods and services as those of Overstock; and the extent to which its pop-up ads 
had created confusion among consumers. (R.541-42.) 
The district court acted outside the bounds of reasonableness in denying Overstock 
the opportunity to develop a full record supporting its legally sufficient claims. Although 
evidence related to confusion is not necessary to prevail on a claim for unfair 
competition, it would certainly lay SmartBargains "open to the inference that it intends its 
products to be confused with and mistaken for [Overstock's] products." Hi-Land, 151 
P.2d at 717. Regardless of the lower court's view of the ultimate issue at that juncture, 
the court should not have granted summary judgment in the face of Overstock's 
reasonable request for additional discovery to further establish its claims. This was an 
abuse of discretion on this record. See Davis v. Central Utah Counseling Ctr., 2006 UT 
52,^30, 142P.3d390. 
In ruling that none of SmartBargains' pop-up advertisements were deceptive or 
confusing, moreover, Judge Hanson had access to only two of the thousands of pop-up 
ads sent by SmartBargains to Overstock's potential customers. (Addend. Exs. 2, 7.) 
Despite the fact that even these two pop-up ads were not the same, Judge Hanson 
necessarily assumed that they were representative of all of the other pop-up ads 
distributed by SmartBargains. In essence, Judge Hanson ruled that pop-up ads which he 
had not seen, and which SmartBargains never produced, were not deceptive or 
misleading and were not an attempt by SmartBargains to pass off as Overstock's 
products. 
At this juncture of the proceedings, it was error to rule without a fully developed 
record. It was not sufficient for SmartBargains to simply make bald assertions, 
unsupported by any evidence, that its pop-up ads could not generate consumer confusion. 
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(R. 754 at 34-35, 38.) SmartBargains gave no affidavits to support a position it was not 
intending to confuse. See id.; see also Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie 
>nd Channel Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1312-16 (2na Cir. 1987) (holding that even disclaimers may 
be insufficient to avoid confusion). On this record, it was unreasonable for the district 
court to dismiss without allowing Overstock a full and fair opportunity to flesh out all the 
facts underlying its well-pleaded claims. In addition to any other grounds meriting 
reversal, the Court should reverse based on the district court's abuse of discretion under 
Rule 56(f). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, individually and collectively, this Court should reverse 
the judgment of the district court dismissing Overstock's common law claims for unfair 
competition and tortious interference, and remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
\th DATED this 30m day of March, 2007. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
By 
John P. Ashton 
Stephen K. Christiansen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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SMART BARGAINS, INC, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff Overstock.com, Inc. ("Overstock"), by their undersigned attorneys, for 
their Complaint allege against Defendant Smart Bargains, Inc. ("Smart Bargains"), as follows: 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
1. This action is for permanent injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees and 
costs arising out of defendant's acts in violation of Utah Spyware Regulation Act Utah Code 
Ann. § 13-39-101 et. seq., unfair competition, and tortious interference with prospective 
COMPLAINT 




business relations by its unauthorized use of pop up advertising on Overstock's Web site which 
interferes with a user's ability to view that site, and solicits and obtains customers from 
Overstock by the invasion of Overstock's Web site. 
THE PARTIES 
2. Overstock is incorporated in the state of Delaware. Its principal place of 
business is in Salt Lake City, Utah. Overstock is an Internet leader in the sale of brand name 
consumer products at clearance prices. The company has partnerships with many brand name 
companies which allow it to buy products at significant discounts and pass those discounts on 
to customers. Overstock is a Utah based company which is a publicly traded company listed 
on NASDAQ. It has sold hundreds of thousands of items through the Internet to more than 3.5 
million customers in its five years in business. 
3. Overstock's customers purchase their products via Overstock's Internet Web 
site, located at www.overstock.com, as well as through its toll-free telephone number, 
"1-800-THE-BIGO." 
4. Upon information and belief, defendant Smart Bargains is a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. Defendant Smart 
Bargains sells consumer products through its Internet Web site, located at 
www.smartbargains.com as well as by telephone and mail, and endeavors to compete with the 
Plaintiff. 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. Smart Bargains is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district because it 
practices the unlawful conduct complained of herein, in part, within the State of Utah because 
the unlawful conduct complained of herein causes injury within the State of Utah; and because 
Smart Bargains regularly does or solicits business, engages in other persistent courses of 
conduct, and/or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered 
within the State of Utah. 
6. Moreover, Smart Bargains regularly and systematically has directed electronic 
activity into the State of Utah with the manifested intent of engaging in business within the 
State and that activity has resulted in causes of action cognizable under the laws of the State. 
Smart Bargains' actions in this regard include causing the regular placement of pop-up 
advertisements upon the screens of numerous PCs within the State; the offering of consumer 
products to PC users within the State, many of whom purchased such products; and entry into 
contracts with residents of the State. Upon information and belief, these actions by Smart 
Bargains were the means by which business was conducted by Smart Bargains within the State 
and which resulted in cognizable causes of action within the State. 
7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-24(1), (2) and (3). 
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8. Venue is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-6 and 7 because some 
of the actions of Smart Bargains have occurred in this district and because Overstock's 
business operations are based in this district. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Internet and the World Wide Web 
9. The Internet is a global network of millions of interconnected computers. The 
World Wide Web is a portion of the Internet especially suited to displaying images and sound, 
in addition to text. Much of the information on the World Wide Web is stored in the form of 
"web pages," which can be access through a computer connected to the Internet (available 
through commercial Internet service providers or "ISPs"), and viewed using a computer 
program called a "browser," such as Microsoft Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator. 
"Web sites" are locations on the World Wide Web containing a collection of Web pages. A 
Web page is identified by its own unique Uniform Resource Locator ("URL")(e.g., 
www.overstock.com), which ordinarily incorporates its site's "domain name" (e.g., 
overstock.com). 
10. Internet use in the United States has grown substantially in the last few years. 
More than half of the nation, roughly 54 million households, are now online. Internet use in 
the United States continues to grow at an astonishing rate of two million new Internet users per 
month. 
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11. The Internet has revolutionized commercial sales activities in the United 
States and throughout the world. Using the Internet, consumers now have the power to 
comparatively shop multiple, worldwide vendors without leaving the comforts of their homes. 
B. The Business of Overstock 
12. Overstock has established and operates a Web site for the purpose of 
advertising and selling consumer products. Plaintiff prominently displays "overstock.com," a 
registered trademark, and "Your online outlet," a trademark for which a federal application has 
been filed, on its Web site. Plaintiff also sells its products through its toll-free telephone 
number. Plaintiff is recognized as a leading Internet seller of consumer products at significant 
discount prices. 
13. Overstock has achieved such success in part because Overstock offers 
consumers a simple, convenient, and efficient method for buying consumer products at 
significant discounts over the Internet. In support of this goal, Overstock has invested in 
excess of $327 million in purchasing its core product inventory. In addition, Overstock has 
invested substantially in the information systems and Internet infrastructure necessary to 
support customer sales. 
14. Overstock derives a substantial portion of its sales from Internet sales or e-
commerce. Therefore, great care and enormous efforts are undertaken by Overstock to present 
its Web page content with a specific "look and feel" that will encourage site visitors to remain 
at the site, to purchase Overstock's products and to return to plaintiffs Web site for future 
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purchases. Overstock deliberately designs its Web site to display and advertise its products 
and related information in a manner that will be visually attractive and easy to navigate for site 
visitors. The Web site is in essence Overstock's "showroom." 
15. Overstock offers users the ability to personalize the services available on or 
through its Web site. For example, customers may "store" their purchase details by registering 
on plaintiffs Web site. 
16. As a result of these design efforts, millions of customers have developed 
strong relationships with Overstock, and return to the overstock.com Web site repeatedly to 
purchase their consumer products. 
17. Overstock uses its Web site to advertise and to sell exclusively its consumer 
products. Plaintiff does not permit other advertising on its Web site. Moreover, the plaintiffs 
Web site does not utilize pop-up advertisements. 
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS 
C. The Business of Smart Bargains 
18. Smart Bargains is in the business of selling consumer products via its Internet 
Web site, located at www.smartbargains.com by telephone and by mail. Upon information 
and belief, Smart Bargains endeavors to compete with Overstock by engaging in aggressive 
advertising schemes that target customers visiting plaintiffs Web site. 
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19. Upon information and belief, beginning in at least the Fall of 2003, Smart 
Bargains, without plaintiffs authorization, caused Smart Bargains1 advertisements to appear 
over the top of some viewers1 copies of the overstockxom Web site. 
20. An example of such an unauthorized Smart Bargains advertisement, as placed 
onto the overstockxom Web page, is set forth below: 
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21. The unauthorized Smart Bargains advertisements alter the appearance of the 
overstock.com Web page. The actions constitute an unauthorized invasion of Overstock's 
"showroom" and create an advertising location for this major competitor in Overstock's own 
"house." 
D. Harm to Plaintiff 
22. Since at least the fall of 2003, Smart Bargains has specifically targeted, and 
continues to target, the plaintiffs Web site for the delivery of unauthorized pop-up advertising. 
23. Upon information and belief, Smart Bargains has already delivered a 
substantial number of unauthorized pop-up type advertisements to Overstock's Web site. 
24. Plaintiff has not given Smart Bargains permission or a license to place 
advertisements onto the overstock.com Web site or copies of the Web page. 
25. Smart Bargains is not licensed or otherwise authorized to use, alter, modify, 
change the appearance of, or add to the overstock.com Web site or copies of the Web page, nor 
is Smart Bargains licensed to create derivative works based on the overstock.com Web site. 
26. All of the pop-up advertisements that Smart Bargains has displayed on the 
Overstock Web Site have been displayed without the authorization or permission of 
Overstock. 
27. Upon information and belief, Smart Bargains knew or should have known of 
plaintiffs exclusive rights in its trademarks and the overstock.com Web site. 
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28. Upon information and belief, Smart Bargains nevertheless caused 
advertisements to be added on to viewers' copies of the overstock.com Web site without any 
independent action taken by the viewer of the site. 
29. Upon information and belief, Smart Bargains caused these advertisements to 
be added onto viewers' copies of the overstock.com Web site with the intent to confuse and 
deceive customers as to the source of Smart Bargains' services and to trade upon the goodwill 
and substantial customer recognition associated with the Overstock marks. 
30. The Smart Bargains advertisements on the overstock.com Web site blur the 
plaintiffs trademarks and dilute the marks' ability to identify plaintiff as a source of goods and 
services. 
31. Plaintiffs current customers have been and will likely continue to be confused 
about the origin and sponsorship of Smart Bargains' services. Potential customers, as well as 
members of the general public, are also likely to be confused. 
32. Confusion regarding Smart Bargains' implied affiliation with Overstock has 
damaged and will continue to damage Overstock's reputation and customer relationships. 
33. In the short term, Smart Bargains' actions steal customers from Overstock, 
erode the attractiveness of shopping on the Overstock's Web site and disrupt Overstock's 
efforts to create a "user friendly" site. In the long term, if left unchecked, Smart Bargains' 
actions imperil the economic viability of Overstock's business. 
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34. Smart Bargains' actions have caused damage and irreparable injury to the 
Overstock. Further damage and irreparable injury will result if Smart Bargains is allowed to 
continue to violate Overstock's rights. 
35. Overstock has no adequate remedy at law. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Violation of The Utah Spyware Regulation Act) 
36. Paragraphs 1 through 35 are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein. 
37. In this session of the Utah Legislature, the Spyware Regulation Act {Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-39-01 et. seq.) was unanimously passed to address the actions of Smart 
Bargains. That statute became effective on May 3, 2004. 
38. By the terms of the statute, at § 13-39-201, Smart Bargains may not, 
. . .use a context-based triggering mechanism to display an 
advertisement that partially or wholly covers or obscures paid 
advertising or other content on an Internet Web site in a way 
that interferes with a user's ability to view the Internet Web 
site. 
39. Smart Bargains actions violate the Spyware Regulation Act as passed by the 
Utah Legislature. 
40. By the terms of the statute, Smart Bargains is subject to (a) an injunction 
against committing any further violations of the chapter; and (b) the recovery of the greater of 
actual damages or $10,000 for each separate violation of the chapter; and the Court may (a) 
increase the damages up to three times the damages allowed above if the Court finds that the 
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defendant willfully or violated the chapter and award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Common Law Unfair Competition) 
41. Paragraphs 1 through 39 are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein. 
42. Smart Bargains actions have caused and are likely to continue to cause 
consumer confusion and cause consumers to believe that Overstock and Smart Bargains or 
their products and services are affiliated. 
43. Consequently, Smart Bargains has misappropriated and / or passed off as its 
own one or more of Overstock's marks, reputation, or goodwill. 
44. Smart Bargains actions were deliberate and were taken in bad faith. 
45. Smart Bargains actions amount to unfair methods of competition in violation 
of the common law principles of fair trade and competition. 
46. As a result of Smart Bargains' actions, Overstock is suffering, and will continue 
to suffer, the loss of profits and damage to its reputation because of consumer confusion as to 
the origin or sponsorship of Smart Bargains' products and services and the association of Smart 
Bargains' products and services with Overstock or Overstock's products and services. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage) 
47. Paragraphs 1 through 45 are repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein. 
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48. Upon information and belief, Smart Bargains was and is aware that Overstock's 
customers regularly and repeatedly purchase consumer products through Overstock's Web site. 
Without improper interference, such customers will continue to visit Overstock's Web site to 
purchase Overstock's goods and services in the future. 
49. In order to interfere with Overstock's current and potential customers, Smart 
Bargains intentionally caused its own pop-up advertisements to appear on or be added to 
viewers' copies of the overstock.com Web site without any independent action taken by viewers 
of the site. 
50. Smart Bargains' actions constitute an improper means of interference with 
Overstock's current and potential customers. 
51. Smart Bargains' actions cause damage to Overstock. Absent the pop-up 
advertising scheme, it is reasonably certain that Overstock would realize additional sales from 
current and potential customers. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment in its favor and against Defendant as : 
follows: 
A. A preliminary and a permanent injunction, prohibiting Smart Bargains, its 
agents, servants, employees, officers, attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or 
participation with them, from: 
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1. Placing, or causing any other entity to place, advertisements of any kind 
on any copy of the overstock.com Web site, without the express consent of the 
Overstock; 
2. Altering or modifying, or causing any other entity to alter or modify, any 
copy of the overstock.com Web site in any way, including its appearance or how it is 
displayed; 
3. Making any designations of origin, descriptions, representations, or 
suggestions that Overstock is the source, sponsor or in any way affiliated with Smart 
Bargains' Web site and services; 
4. Acting in any manner that causes Smart Bargains' products, services, Web 
site, or advertisements to be in any way associated with Overstock's products, 
services, or Web site, including, but not limited to, any means of marketing, 
advertising, or agreements with third parties likely to induce the belief that Smart 
Bargains or Smart Bargains' Web site, advertisements, products, or services are in 
any way associated, connected, or affiliated with, or licensed or authorized by 
Overstock; 
5. Infringing, or causing any other entity to infringe, Overstock's trademarks 
and/or service marks rights; 
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6. Unfairly designating the origin of Smart Bargains' Web site and services, 
or otherwise creating confusion regarding the origin of Smart Bargains' Web site and 
services; 
7. Unfairly competing with Overstock in any manner whatsoever; 
8. Acting, or causing another entity to act, in any manner likely to dilute, 
tarnish, or blur the distinctiveness of the Overstock's marks; 
9. Causing a likelihood of confusion or injuries to Overstock's business 
reputation; and 
10. Interfering with Overstock's reasonable business expectations. 
B. An order directing Smart Bargains, its agents, servants, employees, franchisees, 
licensees, attorneys, and all others in active concert or participation with 
Smart Bargains to deliver to Overstock any agreements between Smart Bargains and any other 
party or parties that relate to the use of any means by which advertisements are 
added on to the overstock.com Web site or viewers' copies thereof; 
C. An order directing Smart Bargains to file with this Court and serve on 
Overstock within thirty (30) days after the service of the injunction, a report in writing, under 
oath, that describes in detail the manner and form in which Smart Bargains has complied with 
the orders of this Court; 
D. An order directing an accounting to determine all gains, profits, savings, and 
advantages obtained by Smart Bargains as a result of its wrongful actions; 
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E. Awarding restitution to Overstock of all gains, profits, savings, and advantages 
obtained by Smart Bargains as a result of its wrongful actions; 
F. Awarding Overstock all damages caused by Smart Bargains' wrongful actions; 
G. Damages pursuant to U.C.A. § 13-39-101, et seq., in an amount the greater of 
actual damages or $10,000 for each separate violation of this chapter. 
H. Awarding Overstock treble the amount of its damages, together with the costs 
of this suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses and prejudgment interest; 
I. Awarding Overstock an amount sufficient to conduct a corrective advertising 
campaign to dispel the effects of Smart Bargains' wrongful conduct and confusing and 
misleading advertising; 
J. An order directing Smart Bargains to post on its Web site corrective advertising 
in a manner and form to be established by the Court; 
K.. Awarding Overstock punitive damages in an amount sufficient to deter other 
and future similar conduct by Smart Bargains and others; and 
L. Granting Overstock such other and further relief as the Court may deem just. 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues and claims so triable. 
DATED this 7 day of May, 2004. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
P. Ashton 
AttonfeVs for PlaintiffOverstock.com 
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SMART BARGAINS, INC., 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS 








Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the "Motion") was before the 
Court for oral argument on the 19th day of November, 2004. David J. Jordan and David L. 
Mortensen of Stoel Rives LLP appeared on behalf of the Defendant Smart Bargains, Inc. 
("Smart Bargains"). John P. Ashton and James W. McConkie III of Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler appeared on behalf of the PlaintiffOverstock.com, Inc. ("Overstock"). 
The Court having considered the Motion, the parties' memoranda, relevant case law, 
and oral argument; and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion is denied as follows: 
1. As to Plaintiff's first claim pursuant to the Utah Spyware Act, the Act is 
effective for purposes of this lawsuit from May 3, 2004, through at least July 
8, 2004. Per Article 6, Section 25 of the Utah Constitution, a stipulation 
entered into between the executive branch of government and a third party is 
not sufficient to alter the effective date of the Act. 
2. As to Plaintiffs remaining claims for common law unfair competition and 
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, Overstock has 
stated a claim upon which relief can be granted and, therefor, Smart Bargains 
Motion as to those claims is also denied. 
DATED this day of January, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form by: 
David J. Jordan / David L. Mortensen 
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by causing a true and correct copy thereof to be mailed, via United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following parties: 
David J. Jordan, Esq. 
David L. Mortensen, Esq. 
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201 South Main, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John P. Ashton, Esq. 
James W. McConkie III, Esq. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 




SMART BARGAINS INC, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
LAW AND MOTION 
Case No: 040909525 MI 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Date: July 31, 2006 
Clerk: evelynt 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN P ASHTON 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID J JORDAN 
DAVID L MORTENSEN 
Video 
Tape Number: dvd 7/31/06 Tape Count: 10:05/11:45' 
HEARING 
This case is before the Court for Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion 
and defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Counsel appearing as shown above. 
The Court addresses the 56(f) motion first. Counsel present 
arguments to the Court. 
The Court denies the motion, and will hear counsel regarding 
defendant's motion for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel present arguments, the Court takes the motion under 
advisement and will issue a written opinion. 
Page 1 (last) 
EXHIBIT 5 
357047v.l 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OVERSTOCK.COM, INC., a : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Delaware corporation, 
CASE NO. 040909525 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SMARTBARGAINS, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on July 31, 2006, 
in connection with SmartBargains' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement to 
further consider the parties' written submissions, the relevant legal 
authority and counsels' oral argument. Being now fully informed, the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The first issue before the Court is the enforceability of the pre-
amendment 2004 Utah Spyware Control Act (the "Act"). SmartBargains' 
Motion for Summary Judgment argues that the Act violates the Dormant 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and the equal protection guarantees of 
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
0VERST0CK.COM V. 
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Notably, SmartBargains provides in-depth analysis and argument 
concerning each of the foregoing Constitutional provisions. The Court 
will instead focus on the primary issue of whether the Act violates the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. In this regard, the Court has reviewed the 
numerous cases cited by the parties and the case of Granholm v. Heald, 
544 U.S. 460 (2005), which Overstock's counsel sent to the Court after 
the hearing. 
After considering the extensive legal authority and the parties' 
briefs, the Court determines that the Act impermissibly and unduly 
burdens interstate commerce in a way that violates the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. Given the inherently interstate nature of the internet, as 
recognized by the court in American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 
160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the broad prohibitions on internet advertisers 
clearly have an extraterritorial application. Further, these 
prohibitions result in a tremendous and adverse impact on those 
advertisers' commercial practices and activities. Overall, the Court is 
persuaded that the Act poses significant burdens on interstate commerce 
and creates the potential for inconsistency in regulations from state to 
state. 
In reaching this decision, the Court has also considered the Utah 
Legislature's enactment of broad and sweeping amendments to the Act in 
2005. These amendments signal a recognition by the Legislature of the 
constitutional flaws which were present in the 2004 Act. These flaws 
0VERST0CK.COM V. 
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first came to light as a result of the constitutional challenge to the 
Act in the case of WhenU.com, Inc. v. State of Utah, Case No. 040907578. 
In that case, Judge Fratto enjoined enforcement of the Act and voiced his 
concerns that the Act violated the dormant Commerce Clause. As the 
history of the Act demonstrates, since its passage in 2004, it's 
enforcement has been forestalled (and apparently abandoned in the WhenU 
case) because of the constitutional issues surrounding it. 
To summarize, the Court determines that the Act violates the Dormant 
Commerce Clause as a matter of law. Having found the Act 
unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, it is unnecessary for 
the Court to assess the other grounds on which the Act may also be 
unconstitutional or whether the Act has been preempted by the Federal 
Copyright Act. Therefore, the Court grants Smartbargains' Motion for 
Summary Judgment concerning the unconstitutionality of the Act under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. 
Next, the Court considers the issues of whether Smartbargains has 
engaged in unfair competition or whether its actions constitute tortious 
interference. 
With respect to the unfair competition claim, the principal inquiry 
is whether Smartbargains' actions have the effect of deceiving or 
defrauding the public with the result of injuring Overstock. The effect 
of pop-up advertising has been considered by several courts, including 
those in the cases of 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 
0VERST0CK.COM V. 
SMARTBARGAINS, INC. PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
400 (2d Cir. 2005) and U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. , 279 
F.Supp.2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003). Having carefully reviewed these cases, 
the Court finds them to be persuasive, particularly because they involve 
unfair competition claims similar to those advanced by Overstock in this 
case. Each of these cases rejected the notion that consumers are 
confused by pop-up ads which are presented in such a way visually that 
they are clearly separate and distinct from the website in which they 
appear. It is undisputed that Smartbargains' ads appear in a separate 
and distinct window and are clearly labeled as being affiliated with 
Smartbargains, rather than the underlying website in which they appear. 
Given the reasoning of 1-800 Contacts and U-Haul, these types of ads 
cannot, as a matter of law, be considered deceptive. Further, the Court 
is unpersuaded by Overstock's arguments concerning initial interest 
confusion because there is no evidence that Smartbargains used 
Overstock's name or trademark. Accordingly, the Court rules that 
Overstock's unfair competition claim fails as a matter of law. 
Likewise, the Court rules that Overstock cannot state a claim of 
tortious interference. Specifically, Overstock's tortious interference 
claim is premised on the Act being found constitutional and/or 
Smartbargains' pop-up ads being found deceptive, confusing or misleading. 
However, given the Court's rulings above, neither of these premises are 
correct. Therefore, Overstock cannot establish the improper means 
element of a tortious interference claim. 
0VERST0CK.COM V. 
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Based on the Court's analysis herein and on the more detailed 
grounds provided in Smartbargains; moving papers, the Court grants 
Smartbargains' Motion for Summary Judgment in the entirety. Counsel for 
Smartbargains is to prepare an Order in accordance with Rule 52 (a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, setting forth the precise grounds and 
legal authority for summary judgment being entered against Overstock. 
The Order is to be consistent with, but not limited to, this Memorandum 
Decision. Counsel is to submit the proposed Order to the Court for 
review and signature. 
Dated this ^/y day of Septenrtber, 2006 
nIM0THY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this_ _day of 
September, 2006 
John P. Ashton 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0450 
David J. Jordan 
David L. Mortensen 
Aaron T. Brogdon 
Attorneys for Defendant 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1100 




David J. Jordan (#1751) 
David L. Mortensen (#8242) 
Aaron T. Brogdon (#9796) 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)328-3131 
Facsimile: (801)578-6999 
Attorneys for SmartBargains, Inc. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OVERSTOCK.COM, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 




SMARTBARGAINS, INC.'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 040909525 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
On July 31, 2006, the Court held a hearing on defendant SmartBargains, Inc.'s 
("SmartBargains") Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). David J. Jordan and David 
L. Mortensen appeared on behalf of SmartBargains. John P. Ashton appeared on behalf of 
plaintiffOverstock.com, Inc. ("Overstock"). The Court being fully advised in the premises and 
having reviewed the parties' memoranda, reviewed and considered the extensive legal authority 
cited by the parties, and heard the arguments presented by the parties, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
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1. During the 2004 General Legislative Session, the Utah State Legislature passed 
the Spyware Control Act (the "Act"), codified at Utah Code Annotated § 13-39-401 (2004). The 
Act provided in relevant part: 
13-40-201. Prohibited conduct. 
(1) A person may not: 
(a) install spyware on another person's computer; 
(b) cause spyware to be installed on another person's computer; or 
(c) use a context based triggering mechanism to display an advertisement 
that partially or wholly covers or obscures paid advertising or other content on 
an Internet website in a way that interferes with a user's ability to view the 
Internet website. 
(2) It is not a defense to a violation of this section that a user may remove or 
hide an advertisement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-201 (2004). 
13-40-301. Private action. 
(1) An action for a violation of this chapter may be brought: 
(b) by any of the following who are adversely affected by a violation of 
this chapter: 
(i) an Internet website owner or registrant; 
(ii) a trademark or copyright owner; or 
(iii) an authorized advertiser on an Internet website. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-30l(l)(b) (2004). 
2. SmartBargains and Overstock are competing online marketers and sellers of 
consumer products. {See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant SmartBargains' Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Overstock Memo") at 1-3.) 
Pursuant to the applicable standard, the Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn there 
from in the light most favorable to Overstock, the nonmoving party. 3D Constr. & Dev., LLC v. Old Standard Life 
Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307, \ 1 n. 2, 117 P.3d 1082. 
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3. As part of its marketing efforts, SmartBargains entered into contractual 
relationships with companies that provide Internet advertising, including the delivery of 
"pop-up" advertisements. (See id.) 
4. Each of the pop-up advertisements presented to the Court by Overstock appears in 
a window that is separate and distinct from other open applications on the computer user's 
desktop, and each pop-up advertisement is clearly labeled as being affiliated with SmartBargains 
rather than the underlying website over which the advertisement appears. (See id.; see, e.g., 
Complaint f 20; Affidavit of Clark Stephens ("Stephens Aff"), Ex. A.) 
5. None of these pop-up advertisements bears the Overstock name or purports to be 
affiliated with or have been delivered by Overstock. (See id.) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Summary judgment is appropriate when the record before the court shows that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); AOKLands, Inc. v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 860 P.2d 924, 925 
(Utah 1993). In addressing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here 
Overstock. 3D Constr. & Dev.} LLC v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307,t 1 n. 2, 
117 P.3d 1082 (quotations and citation omitted). 
2. Having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties and considering the 
arguments, the Court finds that there are no material facts in dispute. (See Overstock Memo 
at 1-3.) 
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The 2004 Act Was Unconstitutional. 
3. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate interstate 
commerce. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The "dormant implication" of the Commerce Clause 
prohibits states from enacting any regulation uthat discriminates against or unduly burdens 
interstate commerce and thereby 'imped[es] free private trade in the national marketplace.555 
General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (citations omitted). 
4. A state law is a per se violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause if it applies to 
commerce "that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce 
has effects within the State.55 Healy v. Beer Inst, 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (citation omitted); 
ACLUv. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999). In addition to per se violations, a state 
law also violates the Dormant Commerce Clause if it (a) could subject interstate commerce to 
inconsistent state regulations, see, e.g., ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1161-62, or (b) imposes a burden on 
interstate commerce that exceeds any local benefit. PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 2004 WL 584355, 
at * 12 (4th Cir. 2004); ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1161. Here, the Act is unconstitutional for all three of 
these reasons. 
5. The Act's broad prohibitions on Internet advertising clearly had an extraterritorial 
application and regulated commerce that occurred wholly outside of Utah. As enacted, the 2004 
Utah Spyware Control Act (the "Act") prohibited, among other things, the installation of 
"spyware on another person's computer" and the use of "a context based triggering mechanism 
to display an advertisement that partially or wholly covers or obscures paid advertising or other 
content on an Internet website in a way that interferes with a users ability to view the Internet 
website." Utah Code Ann, § 13-40-201(1) (2004). According to its plain language, the Act had 
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a tremendous and adverse impact on Internet advertising, including context-based pop-up 
advertising. The Act did not limit its application to Internet advertising occurring in Utah. Thus, 
given the inherently interstate nature of the Internet, as recognized by the Court in American 
Library Ass 'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N. Y. 1997), the Act was a per se violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because it impermissibly and 
unduly burdened interstate commerce. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; ACLUv. Johnson, 194 
F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171); PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d 
227, 240 (4th Cir. 2004); Cyberspace Communs., Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001); Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 177; see also Tracy, 519 U.S. at 287 (citations omitted); 
Nat'lElec. Mfrs. Assn v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2001); Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. 
6. The Act also violated the Dormant Commerce Clause by subjecting businesses 
that rely on online advertising, such as SmartBargains, to the potential for inconsistent state 
regulations. See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 182; American Booksellers Found, v. Dean, 342 F.3d 
96, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Cooley v. Bd of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852)); Cyberspace 
Communs., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 752; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987). 
7. The Act also violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because it imposes a burden 
on interstate commerce that exceeds any local benefit. As noted above, by, among other things, 
prohibiting context-based pop-up advertising, the Act imposed a tremendous and adverse burden 
on Internet advertisements and Internet advertisers. That burden, such as requiring Internet 
advertisers to alter nationwide marketing methods, exceeded any purported benefit of the Act. 
This is particularly true where, as here, it appears that enforcement of the Act would not have 
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achieved those benefits, and any intended local benefit could have been achieved through less 
burdensome means. See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 178-80; PSINet, 2004 WL 584355 at *12; see 
also Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
8. While finding it unnecessary to assess alternative reasons to strike down the Act, 
the Court recognizes that other constitutional grounds may exist that support the Court's ruling 
and that several portions of the Act may have been preempted by the federal Copyright Act. 
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-563 (1980); 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util Comm n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57, 765; Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1085 (Utah 2002); 
17U.S.C. § 301(a); La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416F'.3d 1195, 
1198 (lOthCir. 2005).2 
Unfair Competition 
9. In Utah, "[ujnfair competition consists in passing off or attempting to pass off, 
upon the public, the goods or business of one person as and for the goods or business of 
another." Beard v. Board of Educ. ofN. Summit Sch Dist, 16 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1932). 
Indeed, the principal element of an unfair competition claim is the working of a fraud or 
deception upon consumers. Federal Trade Comm 'n v. WinstedHosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 
(1922) ("The essential elements of unfair competition as known to the common law are 
deception of, or fraud on, the public and consequent injury to competitors."); see also Budget 
2 
The Court notes that flaws in the Act were first identified in WhenU.com, Inc. v. State of Utah, Case No. 
040907578. In that case, this Court (Judge Fratto) enjoined enforcement of the Act, recognizing that it likely 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. Thereafter, in the 2005 legislative session, the Utah Legislature enacted 
broad amendments to the Act that appear to have been intended to address these constitutional flaws. As the history 
of the Act demonstrates, since its passage in 2004, its enforcement has been forestalled (and apparently abandoned) 
because of the constitutional issues surrounding it. 
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System, Inc. v. Budget Loan and Finance Plan, 361 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1961); American 
Airlines v. Christensen, et al, 967 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1992). 
10. Here, it is undisputed that the SmartBargains pop-up advertisements at issue 
appear in separate and distinct windows, bear the SmartBargains5 name, and are not labeled as 
being affiliated with Overstock's website. Moreover, as other courts have recognized, computer 
users are not confused by pop-up advertisements that appear in a window that is separate and 
distinct from the underlying website. Accordingly, the advertisements do not deceive consumers 
as to their source as a matter of law. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 
(2d Cir. 2005); U-HaulInVl, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (E.D. Va. 2003); 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp.2d 734, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
11. Also, Overstock has presented no evidence that SmartBargains has used 
Overstock's trademarks to lure away customers. Thus, SmartBargains' pop-up advertisements 
do not create initial interest confusion with Overstock's website, goods, or services. See 
Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006). 
12. Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that SmartBargains' delivery of pop-up 
advertisements does not constitute unfair competition. 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 410; U-Haul, 
279 F. Supp. 2d at 727; Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 772; see also Beard, 16 P.2d at 902; 
WinstedHosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483. 
Tortious Interference 
13. To state a claim for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations 
under Utah law, a plaintiff "must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the 
plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
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means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 
P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). 
14. While Overstock alleges that SmartBargains5 purpose in delivering the pop-up 
advertisements was to deceive potential customers, it is undisputed that Overstock and 
SmartBargains are competitors and the ultimate purpose of SmartBargains' pop-up 
advertisements was to compete for customers. Competition is not an improper purpose. See 
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307; St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
201 (Utah 1991); see also Trade Comm 'n of Utah v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 
965 (Utah 1968); Altrutech, Inc. v. Hooper Holmes, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(citing D-P Tek, Inc. v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 100 F.3d 828, 832 (10th Cir. 1996)); 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 768(1 )(d). 
15. Also, as noted above, SmartBargains' pop-up advertisements are not deceptive, 
confusing, or misleading. Accordingly, there is nothing independently improper or tortious 
about SmartBargains' delivery of the pop-up advertisements at issue. See Leigh Furniture, 657 
P.2d at 308. 
16. Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that SmartBargains' delivery of pop-up 
advertisements did not constitute tortious interference with Overstock's existing or prospective 
economic relations. See id. 
CONCLUSION 
17. For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons set forth in the memoranda filed by 
SmartBargains in support of its motion for summary judgment, SmartBargains' Motion for 
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Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of SmartBargains on all 
of Overstock's claims, which are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 5 day of October 2006. 
Approved as to form: 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John P. Ashton 
Attorneys for Overstock.com, Inc. 
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I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October 2006,1 served the foregoing ORDER 
GRANTING SMARTBARGAINS, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by 
hand delivery upon the following: 
John P. Ashton 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street, #1600 
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John P. Ashton(0134) 
Nicole M.Deforge (7581) 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0450 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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SMART BARGAINS, INC., 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLARK STEPHENS 
Case No. 040909525 
Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Clark Stephens, being first duly sworn under oath, hereby depose and state as 
follows: 
1. I am an adult and currently reside in Salt Lake City. I am currently 
_Director of Strategy and Business Development - Partner Program_ at Overstock.com. 
I am personally familiar with the facts set forth in this affidavit and submit that the facts 
are true and if called upon to testify would affirm all the matters set forth herein. 
2. On May 5, 2005,1 downloaded the attached pop-up on my computer. To 
my knowledge I had not requested that this Smart Bargains advertisement pop-over the 
Overstock website and took no specific action to change the computer screen which 
automatically provided the pop-up over the Overstock website. 
DATED this _ 0 9 day of May, 2006.^ 
Clark Stephens 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3 _ day of May, 2006. 
mssmt ciis-a- m&su eiEsss XS&SL mam sm>zi ^sas ©A* 
Notary Public * 
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